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Abstract
In a recent line of research, two familiar concepts from logic programming semantics (unfounded sets and
splitting) were extrapolated to the case of epistemic logic programs. The property of epistemic splitting
provides a natural and modular way to understand programs without epistemic cycles but, surprisingly, was
only fulfilled by Gelfond’s original semantics (G91), among the many proposals in the literature. On the
other hand, G91 may suffer from a kind of self-supported, unfounded derivations when epistemic cycles
come into play. Recently, the absence of these derivations was also formalised as a property of epistemic
semantics called foundedness. Moreover, a first semantics proved to satisfy foundedness was also proposed,
the so-called Founded Autoepistemic Equilibrium Logic (FAEEL). In this paper, we prove that FAEEL also
satisfies the epistemic splitting property something that, together with foundedness, was not fulfilled by any
other approach up to date. To prove this result, we provide an alternative characterisation of FAEEL as a
combination of G91 with a simpler logic we called Founded Epistemic Equilibrium Logic (FEEL), which
is somehow an extrapolation of the stable model semantics to the modal logic S5.
KEYWORDS: Answer Set Programming, Epistemic Specifications, Epistemic Logic Programs
1 Introduction
The language of epistemic specifications (Gelfond 1991) or epistemic logic programs extends
disjunctive logic programs, under the stable model (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988) semantics, with
modal constructs called subjective literals. These constructs allow to check whether a regular or
objective literal l is true in every stable model (writtenK l) or in some stable model (writtenM l)
of the program. For instance, the rule:
a←¬Kb (1)
means that a should be derived whenever we cannot prove that all the stable models contain b.
The definition of a “satisfactory” semantics for epistemic specifications has proven to be a
non-trivial enterprise with a long list of alternative semantics (Gelfond 1991;Wang and Zhang 2005;
Truszczyn´ski 2011; Gelfond 2011; Farin˜as del Cerro et al. 2015; Kahl et al. 2015; Shen and Eiter 2017;
∗ This work has been partially supported by the Centre International de Mathe´matiques et d’Informatique de Toulouse
(CIMI) through contract ANR-11-LABEX-0040-CIMI within the programme ANR-11-IDEX-0002-02 and the
Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.
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Cabalar et al. 2019a). The main difficulty arises because subjective literals query the set of stable
models but, at the same time, occur in rules that determine those stable models. As an example,
the program consisting of:
b←¬Ka (2)
plus the above rule (1) has now two rules defining atoms a and b in terms of the presence of
those same atoms in all the stable models. To solve this kind of cyclic interdependence, the
original semantics by Gelfond (1991) (G91) considered different alternative world views or sets
of stable models. In the case of program (1)-(2), G91 yields two alternative world views1, [{a}]
and [{b}], each one containing a single stable model, and this is also the behaviour obtained in the
remaining approaches developed later on. As noted by (Truszczyn´ski 2011), the feature that made
G91 unconvincing, though, was the generation of self-supported world views. A prototypical
example for this effect is the epistemic program consisting of the single rule:
a←Ka (3)
whose world views under G91 are [ /0] and [{a}]. The latter is considered as counter-intuitive by all
authors2 because it relies on a self-supported derivation: a is derived fromKa by rule (3), but the
only way to obtainKa is rule (3) itself. Recently, Cabalar et al. (2019a) proposed to characterise
these unintended world views by extending the notion of unfounded sets (Gelder et al. 1991)
from standard disjunctive logic programs (Leone et al. 1997) to the case of epistemic logic pro-
grams. In that work, the authors also provided a new semantics, called Founded Autoepistemic
Equilibrium Logic (FAEEL), that fulfills that requirement. In fact, FAEEL-world views are pre-
cisely those G91-world views that are founded, that is, those that do not admit any unfounded set.
On the other hand, it is obvious that programs without epistemic cycles (i.e. cycles involving
epistemic literals) cannot have self-supported derivations. In this sense, one could expect that
proposals that tried to get rid of G91 self-supported derivations coincided with the latter, at least,
for epistemically acyclic programs. However, (Lecrerc and Kahl 2018) have recently pointed out
that this is not the case: for instance, while in G91, (purely) epistemic constraints always re-
move world views, this does not hold in other semantics. Watson (2000) and Cabalar et al. (2018;
2019b) went a step farther defining a property called epistemic splitting which, not only defines
an intuitive behaviour for stratified epistemic specifications, but also extends the splitting theo-
rem, well-known for autoepistemic logic (Gelfond and Przymusinska 1992) and standard logic
programs (Lifschitz and Turner 1994), to the case of epistemic logic programs. For instance, if
we consider a program consisting of rules (1)-(2) plus
c←Ka (4)
we may expect to obtain the world views [{a,c}] and [{b}] resulting from adding the atom c
only to the belief sets of the world view that satisfies Ka. This property is known to be satis-
fied by the G91 semantics, but surprisingly not for those that tried to correct its self-supported
problem (Cabalar et al. 2018; Cabalar et al. 2019b).
The major contribution of this paper is the proof that FAEEL satisfies the epistemic splitting
1 For the sake of readability, sets of propositional interpretations are embraced with [ ] rather than { }.
2 This includes Gelfond himself, who proposed a new variant in (Gelfond 2011) motivated by this same example and
further modified this variant later on in (Kahl et al. 2015).
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property as defined in (Cabalar et al. 2018; Cabalar et al. 2019b). Joining this result with the al-
ready known fact that this semantics also satisfies the foundedness property shows that FAEEL
is a solid candidate to serve as a semantics of epistemic logic programs. A second contribution of
this paper is the introduction of a logic that we call Founded Epistemic Equilibrium Logic (FEEL)
and which can be intuitively seen as the combination of the Equilibrium Logic with the modal
logic S5. For the sake of comparative, FAEEL corresponds to the combination of the Equilib-
rium Logic with the Moore’s Autoepistemic Logic (AEL; Moore 1985). In this sense, FEEL is
the combination of a non-monotonic logic with a monotonic one, while FAEEL is the combina-
tion of two non-monotonic logics, a fact that makes FEEL much easier to study. This bring us to
the third contribution of the paper: FAEEL world views can be precisely characterised as those
G91 world views that are at the same time FEEL world views. This allows us to study FAEEL
properties by studying them independently in FEEL and G91 and then combining their results.
This is precisely the methodology used in proving the epistemic splitting theorem for FAEEL.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 revisits the background knowledge
about equilibrium logic, epistemic specifications, the epistemic splitting property and FAEEL
necessary for the rest of the paper. Section 3 introduces FEEL and studies the relation between
this logic and FAEEL. In Section 4, we study the epistemic splitting property in FEEL and
FAEEL and, in Section 5, we discuss other existent approaches to epistemic logic programs.
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Background
We start by recalling the basic definitions needed for the rest of the paper. Given a set of atoms At,
an (epistemic) formula is defined according to the following grammar:
ϕ ::=⊥ | a | ϕ1∧ϕ2 | ϕ1∨ϕ2 | ϕ1 → ϕ2 |Kϕ for any atom a ∈ At.
In our context, the epistemic reading of Kψ is that “ψ is one of the agent’s beliefs.” Thus, a
formula ϕ is said to be subjective if all its atom occurrences (having at least one) are in the scope
ofK. Analogously, ϕ is said to be objective if K does not occur in ϕ . For instance, ¬Ka∨Kb is
subjective,¬a∨b is objective and ¬a∨Kb none of the two. Given a formula ϕ , by Atoms(ϕ) we
denote the set of all atoms occurring in ϕ . For instance, Atoms(¬a∨Kb) = {a,b}. As usual we
define the following derived operators: ϕ ↔ ψ def= (ϕ → ψ)∧ (ψ → ϕ), (ϕ ← ψ) def= (ψ → ϕ),
¬ϕ def= (ϕ → ⊥) and ⊤ def= ¬⊥. An (epistemic) theory is a (possibly infinite) set of formulas
as defined above and an objective theory is a theory whose formulas are objective. We write
Atoms(ϕ) to represent the set of atoms occurring in any formula ϕ and Atoms(Γ) to represent the
set of atoms occurring in any theory Γ. Recall that (Gelfond 1991) included a second subjective
operator M such that M l is readed as “the agent believes that l is possible.” In this paper, we
assume here thatMϕ is just an abbreviation3 for ¬K¬ϕ .
2.1 Equilibrium Logic and the Stable Models Semantics
A propositional interpretation T is a set of atoms T ⊆ At. We write T |= ϕ to represent that T
classically satisfies formula ϕ . An HT-interpretation is a pair 〈H,T 〉 (respectively called “here”
3 Several interpretations ofM are possible in the logics considered in this paper depending on the level of foundedness
that it is expected to satisfy. We limit ourselves here to the simplest interpretation of M , leaving other interpretations
for a more detailed discussion in the future.
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and “there”) of propositional interpretations such that H ⊆ T ⊆ At; it is said to be total when
H = T . We write 〈H,T 〉 |= ϕ to represent that 〈H,T 〉 satisfies a formula ϕ under the recursive
conditions:
• 〈H,T 〉 6|=⊥
• 〈H,T 〉 |= p iff p ∈H
• 〈H,T 〉 |= ϕ ∧ψ iff 〈H,T 〉 |= ϕ and 〈H,T 〉 |= ψ
• 〈H,T 〉 |= ϕ ∨ψ iff 〈H,T 〉 |= ϕ or 〈H,T 〉 |= ψ
• 〈H,T 〉 |= ϕ → ψ iff both (i) T |= ϕ → ψ and (ii) 〈H,T 〉 6|= ϕ or 〈H,T 〉 |= ψ
As usual, we say that 〈H,T 〉 is a model of a theory Γ, in symbols 〈H,T 〉 |= Γ, iff 〈H,T 〉 |= ϕ
for all ϕ ∈ Γ. It is easy to see that 〈T,T 〉 |= Γ iff T |= Γ classically. For this reason, we will
identify 〈T,T 〉 simply as T and will use ‘|=’ indistinctly. Interpretation 〈T,T 〉= T is a stable (or
equilibrium) model of a theory Γ iff T |= Γ and there is no H ⊂ T such that 〈H,T 〉 |= Γ. We write
SM[Γ] to stand for the set of all stable models of Γ.
2.2 G91 semantics for epistemic theories
To represent the agent’s beliefs, we will use a set W of propositional interpretations. We call
belief set to each element I ∈W and belief view the whole setW. The difference between belief
and knowledge is that the former may not hold in the real world. Thus, satisfaction of formulas
will be defined with respect to an interpretation I ⊆ At, possibly I 6∈W, that accounts for the
real world: the pair (W, I) is called belief interpretation (or interpretation in modal logic KD45).
Modal satisfaction is also written (W, I) |= ϕ (ambiguity is removed by the interpretation on the
left) and follows the conditions:
• (W, I) 6|=⊥,
• (W, I) |= a iff a ∈ I, for any atom a ∈ At,
• (W, I) |= ψ1∧ψ2 iff (W, I) |= ψ1 and (W, I) |= ψ2,
• (W, I) |= ψ1∨ψ2 iff (W, I) |= ψ1 or (W, I) |= ψ2,
• (W, I) |= ψ1 → ψ2 iff (W, I) 6|= ψ1 or (W, I) |= ψ2, and
• (W, I) |=Kψ iff (W,J) |= ψ for all J ∈W.
Notice that implication here is classical, that is, ϕ →ψ is equivalent to ¬ϕ ∨ψ in this context. A
belief interpretation (W, I) is a belief model of Γ iff (W,J) |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Γ and all J ∈W∪{I}.
We say that W is an epistemic model of Γ, and abbreviate this as W |= Γ, iff (W,J) |= ϕ for all
ϕ ∈ Γ and all J ∈W. Belief models defined in this way correspond to modal logic KD45 whereas
epistemic models correspond to S5.
Example 1. Take the theory Γ1 = {¬Kb→ a} corresponding to rule (1). An epistemic model
W |= Γ1 must satisfy: 〈W,J〉 |=Kb or 〈W,J〉 |= a, for all J ∈W. We get three epistemic models
from Kb, [{b}], [{a,b}], and [{b},{a,b}] and the rest of cases must force a true, so we also get
[{a}] and [{a},{a,b}]. In other words, Γ1 has the same epistemic models as Kb∨Ka.
Note that rule (1) alone did not seem to provide any reason for believing b, but we got three
epistemic models above satisfyingKb. Thus, we will be interested only in some epistemic mod-
els (that as usual we will call world views) that minimize the agent’s beliefs in some sense. To
define such a minimisation we rely on the following syntactic transformation that extend the one
given by (Truszczyn´ski 2011) by stating a explicit signature in which it is applied. The explicit
signature will be useful later on to define the epistemic splitting property.
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Definition 1 (Subjective reduct). The subjective reduct of a theory Γ with respect to a set of
belief views W and a signature U ⊆ At, also written ΓWU , is obtained by replacing each maximal
subjective formula of the form Kϕ with Atoms(ϕ) ⊆U by ⊤ if W |= Kϕ; or by ⊥ otherwise.
When U = At we just write ΓW.
Finally, we impose a fixpoint condition where each belief set I ∈W is required to be a stable
model of the reduct, obtaining thus the G91 semantics.
Definition 2 (G91 world view). A belief viewW is called a G91-world view of Γ if and only if it
satisfiesW= SM[ΓW].
Example 2 (Example 1 continued). Take any W such that W |= Kb. Then, ΓW
1
= {⊥ → a}
with SM[ΓW
1
] = [ /0]. The empty set does not satisfy Kb so W cannot be a G91-world view of Γ1.
If W 6|= Kb instead, we get ΓW
1
= {⊤ → a}, whose unique stable model is {a}. As a result,
W= [{a}] is the unique G91-world view.
Example 3 (Example 2 continued). Let now Γ2 = {¬Kb→ a , ¬Ka→ b} corresponding to
rules (1)-(2). Take anyW such thatW |=¬Ka∧Kb. Then, ΓW
1
= {⊥→ a ,⊤→ b} and we have
that SM[ΓW
1
] = [{b}]. Since W = [{b}] satisfies ¬Ka∧Kb, this is a G91-world view of Γ2. If
W |=Ka∧¬Kb instead, we get ΓW
1
= {⊤→ a ,⊥→ b}, whose unique stable model is {a}. As
a result, W = [{a}] is also the other G91-world view of Γ2. To see that there is not any other
world views, note that W |= ¬Ka∧¬Kb implies that ΓW
2
= {⊤→ a ,⊤→ b} and SM[ΓW
2
] =
[{a,b}]. So this cannot a G91-world view. Similar, it can be checked that no world view can
satisfy Ka∧Kb.
Example 4. Take now the theory Γ3 = {Ka→ a} corresponding to rule (3). IfW |=Ka we get
ΓW
3
= {⊤→ a} and SM[ΓW
3
] = {a} so W= [{a}] is a G91-world view. If W 6|= Ka, the reduct
becomes ΓW
3
= {⊥→ a}, a classical tautology with unique stable model /0. As a result,W= [ /0]
is the second G91-world view of this theory.
2.3 Epistemic Specifications and Epistemic Splitting
In this section, we recall the formal definition of the Epistemic Splitting property. For the moti-
vation of the interest of this property we refer to (Cabalar et al. 2018; Cabalar et al. 2019b). Let
start by introducing a particular class of theories that correspond to the syntax of epistemic spec-
ifications or (epistemic logic) programs. Given a set of atoms S⊆ At, by ¬S def= { ¬a | a ∈ S } and
¬¬S def= { ¬¬a | a ∈ S } we respectively denote the set resulting of preapend one or two occur-
rences of the default negation operator¬ to every atom in S. An objective literal is either an atom
or a truth constant4, that is a ∈ At∪{⊤,⊥}, or the result of preapend one or two default negation,
¬a. By Litobj def= At∪¬At∪¬¬At∪{⊤,⊥,¬⊤,¬⊥,¬¬⊤,¬¬⊥} we denote the set of all objective
literals. A subjective literal is any expression of the form K l, ¬K l or ¬¬K l with l ∈ Litobj any
objective literal. A literal is either an objective or subjective literal.
A rule r is an implication of the form:
a1∨·· ·∨an ← L1∧·· ·∧Lm (5)
with n≥ 0 andm≥ 0, where each ai ∈At is an atom and each L j a literal. The left hand disjunction
4 For a simpler description of program transformations, we allow truth constants with their usual meaning.
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of (5) is called the rule head and abbreviated asHead(r). When n= 0, it corresponds to⊥ and r is
called a constraint. The right hand side of (5) is called the rule body and abbreviated as Body(r).
As usual, we defineBody+(r) and Body−(r) as the conjunction of all positive and negative literals
in Body(r), respectively, so that Body(r) ≡ Body+(r)∧Body−(r). We further define Bodyobj(r)
and Bodysub(r) as the conjunction of all objective and subjective literals in Body(r), respectively,
so that Body(r)≡ Bodyobj(r)∧Bodysub(r). We also define Body
x
y(r)
def= Bodyx(r)∩Bodyy(r) with
x ∈ {+,−} and y ∈ {obj,sub}. By abuse of notation, we will also use sometimes Bodyx, Bodyy
and Bodyxy as the set of literals occurring in those formulas. Whenm= 0, the body corresponds to
⊤ and r is called a fact (in this case, the body and the arrow symbol are usually omitted). A rule
is called objective if all literals occurring in it are objective. A program Π is a (possibly infinite)
set of rules and an objective program is a program where all its rules are objective. We are now
ready to recall the epistemic splitting property:
Definition 3 (Epistemic splitting set). A set of atoms U ⊆ At is said to be an epistemic splitting
set of a program Π if for any rule r in Π one of the following conditions hold
(i) Atoms(r)⊆U,
(ii) (Atoms(Bodyobj(r)∪Head(r)))∩U = /0
We define a splitting of Π as a pair 〈BU(Π),TU (Π)〉 satisfying BU(Π)∩ TU(Π) = /0, BU(Π)∪
TU(Π) = Π, all rules in BU(Π) satisfy (i) and all rules in TU(Π) satisfy (ii).
With respect to the original definition of splitting set, we can see that the condition for the top pro-
gram Atoms(Head(r))∩U = /0 was replaced by the new condition (ii), which intuitively means
that the top program may only refer to atomsU in the bottom through epistemic operators. An-
other observation is that the definition of BU(Π) and TU(Π) is kept non-deterministic in the
sense that some rules can be arbitrarily included in one set or the other. These rules correspond
to subjective constraints on atoms in U , since these are the only cases that may satisfy condi-
tions (i) and (ii) simultaneously. Then, the idea is similar as in splitting a regular program: first
we compute the world views of the bottom program BU(Π) and for each one we compute the
world views of the top program after simplifying in it the subjective literals fixed by the bottom
part. Formally, given an epistemic splitting setU for a program Π and belief viewW, we define
EU(Π,W)
def= TU(Π)
W
U , that is, we make the subjective reduct of the top with respect to W and
signatureU .
Definition 4. Given a semantics S, a pair 〈Wb,Wt〉 is said to be a S-solution of Π with respect
to an epistemic splitting set U if Wb is a S-world view of BU(Π) and Wt is a S-world view of
EU(Π,Wb).
Notice that this definition depends on a particular semantics S in the sense that each alter-
native semantics for epistemic specifications will define its own solutions for a given U and Π.
In particular, in this paper, we will consider five instantiations of this Definition 4 with seman-
tics S ∈ {G91,FAEEL,FEEL,EEL,AEEL}. Besides the already mentioned G91, Founded Au-
toepistemic EEL (FAEEL) and Founded EEL (FEEL) semantics,5 we will also consider the EEL
and AEEL semantics from (Farin˜as del Cerro et al. 2015).
5 To avoid possible confusions between FAEEL, FEEL, AEEL and EEL, we will sometimes write them as Founded
Autoepistemic EEL, Founded EEL, Autoepistemic EEL and EEL respectively, when they occur in the same sentence.
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Example 5 (Example 3 continued). Back to our example, let now Π4 be the program consisting
of rules (1)-(2) and (4). Then, we can see that U = {a,b} is an epistemic splitting set of Π4 and
that it satisfies BU(Π4) = {(1)− (2)} and TU(Π4) = {(4)}. Furthermore, we have already seen
that BU(Π4) corresponds to the theory Γ2 which has the following two G91-world views: [{a}]
and [{b}]. Then, we can see that EU(Π4, [{a}]) = {c←⊤} has a unique G91-world view [{c}]
and that EU(Π4, [{b}]) = {c←⊥} has the unique G91-world view [ /0]. As a result, we have two
G91-solutions of Π4 with respect to {a,b}: 〈[{a}], [{c}]〉 and 〈[{b}], [ /0]〉. It is also easy to check
that BU(Π4) has two G91-world views, [{a,c}] and [{b}] that can be obtained by composing the
two above solutions.
In the general case, the world views for the global program are reconstructed by the following
operation:
Wb⊔Wt = { Ib∪ It | Ib ∈Wb and It ∈Wt }
(remember that both the bottom and the top may produce multiple world views, depending on
the program and the semantics we choose). For any set of atomsU ⊆ At and belief view W, we
also define the restriction ofW toU asW|U
def= { I∩U | I ∈W }. Furthermore, we also define the
complement of a set of atoms asU
def= At\U .
Property 1 (Epistemic splitting). A semantics S satisfies epistemic splitting if for any epistemic
splitting set U of any program Π:W is a S-world view of Π iff there is a S-solution 〈Wb,Wt〉 of
Π with respect to U such thatW=Wb⊔Wt .
Theorem 1. Semantics G91 satisfies epistemic splitting. Furthermore, ifW is a G91-world view
of some program Π with respect to some splitting set U, then 〈W|U ,W|U〉 is a G91-solution of Π
and it satisfies thatW=W|U ⊔W|U .
Theorem 1 was proved in (Cabalar et al. 2019b, Main Theorem). Note that there, it is only
stated that G91 satisfies epistemic splitting, however it is easy to see that the second part of
the statement was proved as an auxiliary result inside the proof of that theorem. We decided to
explicitly state this result as it will be useful for proving that FAEEL satisfies epistemic splitting.
2.4 Founded Autoepistemic Equilibrium Logic
We recall now the semantics of FoundedAutoepistemic Equilibrium Logic (FAEEL) from (Cabalar et al. 2019a).
The basic idea is an elaboration of the belief (or KD45) interpretation (W, I) already seen but
replacing belief sets by HT pairs. Thus, the idea of belief viewW is extended to a non-empty set
of HT-interpretations W = {〈H1,T1〉, . . . ,〈Hn,Tn〉} and say that W is total when Hi = Ti for all
of them, coinciding with the form of belief views W = {T1, . . . ,Tn} we had so far. Similarly, a
belief interpretation is now redefined as (W,〈H,T 〉), or simply (W,H,T ), where W is a belief
view and 〈H,T 〉 stands for the real world, possibly not in W. A belief interpretation (W,H,T )
is called total iff both 〈H,T 〉 andW are total. Next, the satisfaction relation is defined as a com-
bination of modal logic KD45 and HT. A belief interpretation I = (W,H,T ) satisfies a formula
ϕ , written I |= ϕ , iff:
• I 6|=⊥,
• I |= a iff a ∈ H, for any atom a ∈ At,
• I |= ψ1∧ψ2 iff I |= ψ1 and I |= ψ2,
• I |= ψ1∨ψ2 iff I |= ψ1 or I |= ψ2,
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• I |= ψ1 → ψ2 iff both: (i) I 6|= ψ1 or I |= ψ2; and (ii) (W
t ,T ) 6|= ψ1 or (W
t ,T ) |= ψ2,
where6 Wt = {Ti | 〈Hi,Ti〉 ∈W}.
• I |=Kψ iff (W,Hi,Ti) |= ψ for all 〈Hi,Ti〉 ∈W.
A belief interpretation (W,H,T ) is called a belief model of a theory Γ iff (W,Hi,Ti) |= ϕ for all
HT-interpretation 〈Hi,Ti〉 ∈W∪{〈H,T 〉} and all ϕ ∈Γ. Given theoriesΓ and Γ
′, we write Γ |= Γ′
when (W,H,T ) |= Γ implies (W,H,T ) |= Γ′ for all belief interpretations. We write Γ ≡ Γ′ iff
Γ |= Γ′ and Γ′ |= Γ. Furthermore, when Γ or Γ′ are singletons we may omit the brackets around
their unique formula.
Recall that the negation of a formula ¬ϕ is defined as an abbreviation for the implication
ϕ →⊥. The following result is immediate from the above definition plus the persistence property
proved in (Cabalar et al. 2019a) (Proposition 1) and explicitly states the evaluation of negation:
Proposition 1. Given a belief interpretation I = (W,H,T ) and a formula ϕ , it follows that
I |= ¬ϕ iff (Wt ,T ) 6|= ϕ .
As recalled in Section 2.1, stable models correspond to a class of HT-models called equilibrium
models, that is, total minimal models. Similarly, we define now equilibrium belief models as total
minimal belief models with respect to the following order relation:
Definition 5. We define the partial order I ′  I for belief interpretations I ′ = (W′,H ′,T ′) and
I = (W,H,T ) when the following three conditions hold:
(i) T ′ = T and H ′ ⊆ H, and
(ii) for every 〈Hi,Ti〉 ∈W, there is some 〈H
′
i ,Ti〉 ∈W
′, with H ′i ⊆ Hi.
(iii) for every 〈H ′i ,Ti〉 ∈W
′, there is some 〈Hi,Ti〉 ∈W, with H
′
i ⊆ Hi.
As usual, I ′ ≺ I means I ′  I and I ′ 6= I.
Definition 6. A total belief interpretation I = (W,T ) is said to be an equilibrium belief model
of some theory Γ iff I is a belief model of Γ and there is no other belief model I ′ of Γ such that
I ′ ≺ I.
By EQB[Γ] we denote the set of equilibrium belief models of Γ. As a final step, we impose a
fixpoint condition to minimise the agent’s knowledge as follows.
Definition 7. A total belief viewW is called an autoepistemic equilibriummodel or FAEEL-world
view of Γ iff:
W = { T | (W,T ) ∈ EQB[Γ] }
Theorem 2 (Main Theorem in Cabalar et al. 2019a). For any theory Γ, its FAEEL-world views
are exactly its founded7 G91-world views of Γ.
6 Note that Wt is a belief view as defined in Section 2.2.
7 For space reasons we omit here the definition of founded world view and refer the reader to (Cabalar et al. 2019a).
Intuitively, a world view is founded if all atoms that are true in all its belief set can be derived without cyclic references.
If we omit there founded, we obtain that every FAEEL-world view is also a G91-world view, but not necessarily vice-
versa.
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3 Founded Epistemic Equilibrium Logic
Founded EEL is similar to Founded Autoepistemic EEL, but without the minimisation of knowl-
edge. Technically, this makes Founded EEL simpler in two distinct ways: (i) it directly uses belief
views instead of belief interpretations and, as a result, (ii) it lacks the autoepistemic fixpoint con-
dition (Definition 7). Note that, as mentioned in the introduction Founded EEL can be seen as the
combination of the stable model semantics with the modal logic S5, while Founded Autoepis-
temic EEL would be the combination of the stable model semantics with Moore’s Autoepistemic
Logic. In this sense, (i) is a direct consequence of the fact that Moore’s Autoepistemic Logic
is defined in terms of modal logic KD45 instead of S5. In its turn, (ii) is a consequence of the
fact that S5 is a monotonic logic, and thus Founded EEL do not need the autoepistemic fixpoint
condition (Definition 7) that Founded Autoepistemic EEL inherits from Moore’s Autoepistemic
Logic.
Formally, a belief view W is called an epistemic model of a theory Γ, in symbols W |= Γ iff
(W,Hi,Ti) |= ϕ for all HT-interpretation 〈Hi,Ti〉 ∈W and all ϕ ∈ Γ. Given theories Γ and Γ
′, we
write Γ |=FEEL Γ
′ when (W,H,T ) |= Γ implies (W,H,T ) |= Γ′ for all belief interpretations. We
write Γ≡FEEL Γ
′ iff Γ |=FEEL Γ
′ and Γ′ |=FEEL Γ. As above, when Γ or Γ
′ are singletons we may omit
the brackets around their unique formula.
Proposition 2 (Persistence). W |= ϕ impliesWt |= ϕ .
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 1 in (Cabalar et al. 2019a).
The following order relation adapts Definition 5 to the case of belief views.
Definition 8. Given belief viewsW1 andW2, we writeW1 W2 iff the following two condition
hold:
(i) for every 〈H2,T 〉 ∈W2, there is some 〈H1,T 〉 ∈W1, with H1 ⊆ H2.
(ii) for every 〈H1,T 〉 ∈W1, there is some 〈H2,T 〉 ∈W2, with H1 ⊆ H2.
As usual, we write W1 ≺W2 iff W1 W2 andW1 6=W2.
Then, equilibrium epistemic models are defined as usual:
Definition 9. A total epistemic model W of a theory Γ is said to be an epistemic equilibrium
model or FEEL-world view iff there is no other epistemic modelW′ of Γ such thatW′ ≺W.
The following observation establishes a relation between (equilibrium) belief models and
(equilibrium) epistemic models similar to the existent between the standard modal logics KD45
and S5. Recall that belief models correspond to the logical product of HT and KD45 while epis-
temic models come from the logical product of HT and S5.
Observation 1. For any theory Γ and belief interpretation I = 〈W,H,T 〉, the following state-
ments hold:
(i) If I is a belief model of Γ, thenW is a epistemic model of Γ, and
(ii) If I is an equilibrium belief model of Γ, thenW is a equilibrium epistemic model of Γ.
From this observation the following relation between autoepistemic equilibrium models and
epistemic equilibrium models can be established:
Theorem 3. Every FAEEL-world view of any theory Γ is also an FEEL-world view of Γ.
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In general the converse does not necessary holds as illustrated by the following example:
Example 6. Consider the program Π1 consisting of the single rule a∨b. This program has two
stable models, {a} and {b} and accordingly a unique FAEEL-world view [{a},{b}]which agrees
with its unique G91-world view. On the other hand, this program has two extra FEEL-world
views that are not FAEEL-world views: [{a}] and [{b}]. These two extra models are clearly not
well-justified in an epistemic sense as they respectively satisfy Ka and Kb with no evidence
for that conclusion. Finally, to see the difference between FEEL and modal logic S5, note that
[{a,b}] is also an S5 model which is neither a FEEL nor a FAEEL-world view.
This example also illustrates that the difference between FAEEL and FEEL can be formalised
in terms of the supra-ASP property introduced in (Cabalar et al. 2019b) and recalled below:
FAEEL satisfies supra-ASP (Cabalar et al. 2019a, Proposition 3) while FEEL does not.
Property 2 (Supra-ASP). A semantics S satisfies supra-ASP if for any objective program Π
either Π has a unique S-world viewW= SM[Π] 6= /0 or both SM[Π] = /0 and Π has no S-world
view at all.
On the other hand, the following result shows that we can obtain FAEEL-world views as the
intersection of FEEL and G91-world views:
Theorem 4. For any theory Γ, a belief viewW is a FAEEL-world view iff (i)W is a FEEL-world
view and (ii)W is a G91-world view.
Example 7 (Example 4 continued). Back to Γ3 = {Ka→ a}, recall that this theory has two
G91-world views: [ /0] and [{a}]. It is easy to see that [ /0] is a FEEL-world view and, from The-
orem 4, this implies that this is also a FAEEL-world view. Note that there is no smaller belief
view than [ /0], so being a model is enough to show that is a FEEL-world view. Note that, by
using Theorem 4, is much easier to see that [ /0] is a FAEEL-world view than directly using its
definition since we would also need to check no other T 6∈ [ /0] satisfies ([ /0],T ) ∈ EQB[Γ3]. In
this case, the only possibility is ([ /0],{a}) which fails because there is a smaller belief model
([ /0], /0,{a}) satisfying Ka→ a. On the other hand, we can see that [{a}] is not a FEEL-world
view and, thus neither FAEEL-world view, because [〈 /0,{a}〉] also satisfies Γ3. In this case, it is
also easier to use Theorem 4 than using the FAEEL definition: [{a}] is not a FAEEL-world view
because I ′ = ([{a}],{a}) 6∈ EQB[Γ3] and this is the case because the smaller interpretation
I ′′ = ([〈 /0,{a}〉],{a},{a}) also satisfies Γ3. In particular, note that I
′′ 6|= Ka and, thus, clearly
satisfies Ka→ a.
Example 7 illustrates how Theorem 4 can be used to find FAEEL-world views using FEEL.
In general, this is much easier than directly applying their definition because belief views are
simpler than belief interpretations and because the autoepistemic fixpoint can be checked inde-
pendently using the G91-semantics.
4 Epistemic Splitting in Founded (Auto)Epistemic Equilibrium Logic
Let us now study the epistemic splitting property in FEEL and FAEEL. Let us start by stating a
result analogous to Theorem 1, but this time for FEEL.
Theorem 5 (Epistemic splitting in FEEL). FEEL satisfies the epistemic splitting property. Fur-
thermore, if W is a FEEL-world view of some program Π with respect to some splitting set U
then 〈W|U ,W|U 〉 is a FEEL-solution of Π and it satisfies thatW=W|U ⊔W|U .
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The proof of Theorem 5 is based in the following auxiliary results whose proof can be found
in the supplementary material.
Proposition 3. Let U ⊆ At be some set of atoms and Π = Π1 ∪Π2 be a program such that
Atoms(Π1) ⊆U and Atoms(Π2) ⊆U. Then, any belief view W is an FEEL-world view of Π iff
W|U is an FEEL-world view of Π1 andW|U is an FEEL-world view of Π2.
Intuitively, Proposition 3 says that, if we can split a program in a way that its two halves do
not share atoms in common, then we can compute the world views of the whole program by
combining the world views of each half. Furthermore, the following result shows that we can
check whether a belief view is an FEEL-world view by checking instead that that belief view is
a FEEL-world view of a program obtained by simplifying the subjective literals in the rules of
the top part accordingly to the belief view.
Proposition 4. Let Π be a program with epistemic splitting set U ⊆At. Then, any belief viewW
is an FEEL-world view of Π iffW is an FEEL-world view of BU(Π)∪EU(Π,W).
We can now join Propositions 3 and 4 to show the following rewriting of epistemic splitting.
Proposition 5. Given any program Π and epistemic splitting set U of Π, a belief view W is an
FEEL-world view of Π iffW|U is an FEEL-world view of BU(Π) andW|U is an FEEL-world view
ofW|U of EU(Π,W|U ).
Proof. First note that, from Proposition 4, it follows that W is an FEEL-world view of Π iff W
is an FEEL-world view of BU(Π)∪EU(Π,W). Furthermore, we have EU(Π,W) = EU(Π,W|U ).
Therefore, we immediately can see thatW is an FEEL-world view of Π iffW is an FEEL-world
view of BU(Π)∪EU(Π,W|U ). Furthermore, by construction we have Atoms(BU(Π)) ⊆ U and
Atoms(EU(Π,W|U )) ⊆U and, from Proposition 3, this implies that the latter holds iff W|U is an
FEEL-world view of BU(Π) andW|U is an FEEL-world view of EU(Π,W|U).
Proof of Theorem 5. Assume first that W is an equilibrium epistemic model of Π. Then, from
Proposition 5, it follows that W|U is an FEEL-world view of BU(Π) and W|U is an FEEL-world
view of W|U of EU(Π,W|U ) and it is easy to check that W=W|U ⊔W|U . The other way around,
assume there are FEEL-world viewsWb of BU(Π) andWt of EU(Π,Wb) and letW=Wb⊔Wt .
Note that Atoms(BU (Π)) ⊆ U implies that every interpretation T ∈ Wb satisfies T ⊆ U and
that Atoms(EU(Π,Wb)) ⊆U implies that every T ∈Wt satisfies T ⊆U . Hence, it follows that
Wb =W|U andWt =W|U and the result follows directly from Proposition 5.
We can now use Theorem 5 in combination with Theorems 1 and 4 to show that FAEEL also
satisfies epistemic splitting.
Main Theorem (Epistemic splitting in FAEEL). FAEEL satisfies the epistemic splitting property.
Furthermore, ifW is a FAEEL-world view of some programΠ with respect to some splitting setU
then 〈W|U ,W|U 〉 is a FAEEL-solution of Π and it satisfies thatW=W|U ⊔W|U .
Proof. Assume first that there is FAEEL-solution 〈Wb,Wt〉 of some program Π with respect to
some splitting setU and letW=Wb⊔Wt . By definition, this implies thatWb is a FAEEL-world
view of BU(Π)which, from Theorem 4, implies thatWb is both a FEEL and a G91-world view of
BU(Π). Similarly, we can see thatWt is both a FEEL and a G91-world view of EU(Π,Wb) and,
thus, that 〈Wb,Wt〉 is both a FEEL and a G91-solution of Π with respectU . From Theorems 1
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and 5, these two facts respectively imply that W is both a FEEL and a G91-world view of Π
which, from Theorem 4 again, implies thatW is a FAEEL-world view of Π.
The other way around is analogous. Assume now that W is a FAEEL-world view of some
program Π with splitting set U . Then, from Theorem 4, it follows that W is both a FEEL and a
G91-world view. From Theorems 1 and 5, these two facts respectively imply that 〈W|U ,W|U〉 is a
FEEL and a G91-solution of Π with respect toU andW=W|U ⊔W|U . Finally, from Theorem 4
again, this implies that 〈W|U ,W|U〉 is also a FAEEL-solution.
It is interesting to note that for any semantics that satisfies epistemic splitting, thus FAEEL
and G91, constraints indented to remove world views are well-behaved:
Property 3 (Subjective constraint monotonicity). A semantics satisfies subjective constraint
monotonicity if, for any epistemic program Π and any subjective constraint r, W is a world
view of Π∪{r} iff both W is a world view of Π andW |= r.
Theorem 6 (Theorem 2 in Cabalar et al. 2019b). Epistemic splitting implies subjective con-
straint monotonicity.
Furthermore, this property also guarantees that, for epistemically stratified programs, these se-
mantics have at most a unique world view (see Theorem 1 in Cabalar et al. 2019b). Another in-
teresting property, not included in (Cabalar et al. 2019b), is that any semantics that satisfies epis-
temic splitting and the supra-ASP property, necessary coincides with the G91-semantics for the
class of epistemic stratified programs. Before tackling the notion of epistemic stratification, let
us recall the epistemic dependence relation among atoms in a program Π so that dep(a,b) is true
iff there is a rule r ∈Π such that a ∈ Atoms(Head(r)∪Bodyobj(r)) and b ∈ Atoms(Bodysub(r)).
Definition 10. We say that an epistemic program Π is epistemically stratified if we can assign
an integer mapping λ : At→ N to each atom such that λ (a)> λ (b) for any pair of atoms a,b
satisfying dep(a,b).
Theorem 7. Given any two semantics S and S ′ that satisfy the epistemic splitting and supra-ASP
properties and an epistemically stratified program Π, one of following two condition hold:
(i) Π has neither S-world view nor S ′-world view, or
(ii) Π has exactly one S and one S ′-world viewW which is the same in both semantics.
Proof. The proof follows by induction in the number of layers induced by the stratifications.
Note that, if a program has a unique layer, then it must be objective and, thus, the result follows
directly from the supra-ASP property. Otherwise, let a ∈ At such that there is no b ∈ At with
λ (a) < λ (b) and let U = { c ∈ At | λ (c) < λ (a) }. Then, U is an splitting set of Π and the
epistemic splitting property tell us a belief view W is a S-world view of Π iff there are S-world
viewsWb of BU(Π) andWt of EU(Π,Wb). Furthermore,BU(Π) and EU(Π,Wb) have less layers
than Π so, by induction hypothesis, this holds iff iff there are S ′-world views Wb of BU(Π) and
Wt of EU(Π,Wb) iffW is a S
′-world view of Π.
Corollary 1. For epistemically stratified programs, FAEEL and G91-world views coincide.
Note that Corollary 1 does not apply to FEEL because this semantics does not satisfy supra-ASP
as illustrated by Example 6. Recall also that, from Proposition 2 in (Cabalar et al. 2019a), we al-
ready knew that, for programs where all occurrences of K are in the scope of negation, FAEEL
and G91-world views coincide. Corollary 1 enlarges the class programs in which FAEEL and
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G91 coincide by including all those that are epistemically stratified. This immediately arises the
question whether FAEEL and G91 also coincide for programs without positive cycles involving
epistemic literals. The following result shows that this is indeed the case. Formally, we define the
positive epistemic dependence relation among atoms in a program Π so that dep+(a,b) is true
iff there is a rule r ∈Π such that a ∈ Atoms(Head(r)∪Bodyobj(r)) and b ∈ Atoms(Body
+
sub(r)).
Definition 11. We say that an epistemic program Π is epistemically tight if we can assign an
integer mapping λ : At→ N to each atom such that λ (a)> λ (b) for any pair of atoms a,b
satisfying dep+(a,b).
Definition 12. Given an epistemic theory Γ and a belief viewW, its negatively subjective reduct,
in symbols ΓW, is obtained by replacing each maximal subjective formula of the form ¬Kϕ by⊤
if W 6|=Kϕ; or by ⊥ otherwise.
Proposition 6. Given a theory Γ and, a total belief viewW is FAEEL-world view of Γ iffW is a
FAEEL-world view of ΓW.
Theorem 8. For epistemically tight programs, FAEEL and G91-world views coincide.
Proof. For any belief viewW and espistemically tight programΠ it follows thatW is FAEEL-world
view of Π iffW is a FAEEL-world view of ΠW (Proposition 6). Furthermore, it is easy to see that,
since Π is espistemically tight, ΠW is also espistemically tight. Moreover, for every r ∈ ΠW and
every L ∈ Bodysub(r), we can check that L ∈ Body
+(r). That is, there are no subjective literals in
the scope of negation and, thus, ΠW being espistemically tight implies that ΠW is espistemically
stratified. Then, the result follows directly from Corollary 1.
It is also worth to mention that, as observed in (Cabalar et al. 2019a), it is possible to obtain
Moore’s Autoepistemic Logic from FAEEL simply by adding the exclude middle axiom p∨¬p
for every atom in the signature. Note that, if the original program was stratified, augmenting it
with these formulas does not change this property. As a result we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 2. Any epistemically stratified program Π has at most one Moore’s autoepistemic
extension.
A similar result was originally proved in (Gelfond 1987, Theorem 4). Note that the class of
programs considered stratified by us is slightly broader than the one used in (Gelfond 1987):
constraints are allowed in every strata and no distinction is made between positive and nega-
tive objective literals. The price to pay is that Corollary 2 does not ensure the existence of an
extension.
5 Related work
As mentioned in the introduction, the search for a “satisfactory” semantics for epistemic logic
programs has leave us with a variety of semantics (Gelfond 1991;Wang and Zhang 2005; Truszczyn´ski 2011;
Gelfond 2011; Farin˜as del Cerro et al. 2015; Kahl et al. 2015; Shen and Eiter 2017; Cabalar et al. 2019a).
Among this Epistemic Equilibrium Logic (EEL; Farin˜as del Cerro et al. 2015) is very similar to
Founded EEL in the sense that it is also defined as a combination of Equilibrium Logic and the
modal logic S5. There are some slight differences though, and as the name suggest Founded
EEL satisfies the founded property defined (Cabalar et al. 2019a) while EEL does not. In fact,
EEL can be characterised by a particular class of belief views that we call here simple:
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Definition 13. We say that a belief view W is simple iff for any 〈H,T 〉 ∈W and 〈H ′,T 〉 ∈W,
we have H = H ′. A a total belief view W is called an EEL-world view of a theory Γ iff W is a
belief model of Γ and there is no simple belief model W′ of Γ satisfying W= (W′)t and H ⊂ T
for some 〈H,T 〉 ∈W′.
It is easy to see that Definition 13 is just a rephrasing of epistemic equilibrium models as
defined in (Farin˜as del Cerro et al. 2015) by using the notation of this paper.
Proposition 7. A a total belief view W is an EEL-model of a theory Γ iff W is a belief model
of Γ and there is no simple belief modelW′ of Γ such thatW′ ≺W.
Theorem 9. Every FAEEL and FEEL-world view of any theory Γ is also an EEL-world view.
Proof.Note that that every total belief view is simple, though there are non-total belief views that
are not simple. Then, the result follows directly from Proposition 7 and Theorem 3.
As illustrated by the following example, in general, the converse of Theorem 9 does not hold.
Example 8. Take the epistemic logic program:
a∨b a←Kb b←Ka (Π2)
whose unique epistemic equilibrium model is W = [{a},{b}]. Note that W′ = [{a,b}] is not an
epistemic equilibrium model because W′′ ≺W′ with W′′ = [〈{a},{a,b}〉,〈{b},{a,b}〉]. How-
ever, W′ is an EEL-model. Note that W′′ is not a simple belief view and, thus, cannot be used
as a witness to show that W′ is not an EEL-model. On the other hand, the simple belief views
[〈{a},{a,b}〉], [〈{b},{a,b}〉], and [〈 /0,{a,b}〉] are not models of this program.
Interestingly, it can be shown that EEL also satisfies epistemic splitting.
Theorem 10 (Epistemic splitting in EEL). EEL satisfies the epistemic splitting property. Fur-
thermore, ifW is a EEL-world view of some program Π with respect to some splitting set U then
〈W|U ,W|U 〉 is a EEL-solution of Π and it satisfies thatW=W|U ⊔W|U .
The proof of Theorem 10 is analogous to the proof of Theorem 5 just taking into account
that now we have to restrict ourselves to simple interpretations. Note that, in general, EEL
does not satisfy supra-ASP. Example 6 can be used to illustrate this statement and, in fact,
the program in this example has exactly the same EEL-world views as FEEL-world views. For
this reason (Farin˜as del Cerro et al. 2015) also included a selection of EEL-world views called
AEEL-world views in a similar spirit as how FAEEL-world views are a selection of FEEL-world
views. However, it has been shown in (Cabalar et al. 2018; Cabalar et al. 2019b) that AEEL does
not satisfy epistemic splitting. Theorem 10 sheds more light into this issue by showing that it is
not the EEL logic, but the selection of AEEL-world views, what breaks the splitting property. In
this sense, it would be possible to define AEEL-world views in an alternative way as the inter-
section of EEL-world views and G91-world views and obtain yet another semantics that satisfy
epistemic splitting. Note though that this alternative semantics (EEL+G91) would not satisfy the
foundedness property introduced in (Cabalar et al. 2019a). In fact, a variation of Example 8, ob-
tained by adding the constraint ⊥ ← ¬Ka to program Π2, was used (Cabalar et al. 2019a) to
show that, among others, AEEL does not satisfy the foundedness property. This same example
can also be used to show that EEL and EEL+G91 do not satisfy it.
To summarise the state of the art, let us recall the remaining property introduced in (Cabalar et al. 2018;
Cabalar et al. 2019b):
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G91 G11 EEL AEL EEL+G91 K15 S17 FEEL FAEEL
Supra-S5 D D D D D D D D D
Supra-ASP D D D D D D D
Subjective constraint
monotonicity
D D D D D D
Splitting D D D D D
Foundness D D
Table 1. Summary of properties in different semantics.
Property 4 (Supra-S5). A semantics satisfies supra-S5 when for every world viewW of an epis-
temic program Π and for every I ∈W, 〈W, I〉 |= Π.
Table 1 summarises the known results for different semantics with respect to Properties 1-4
plus foundness. Recall that, intuitively, foundnessmeans that a semantics is free of self-supported
world view. For space reasons, we refer to (Cabalar et al. 2019a) for a formal definition. Recall
also that (Wang and Zhang 2005; Truszczyn´ski 2011) extended the semantics of G91 to arbi-
trary theories in different ways, but for the class of logic programs both of them agree with
G91. For this reason, we will refer to both of them just as G91 in the table. Counterexam-
ples for the non satified properties can be founed in (Kahl and Leclerc 2018; Cabalar et al. 2018;
Cabalar et al. 2019b; Cabalar et al. 2019a) and in this paper for the case of EEL and FEEL not
satisfying Supra-ASP. Proofs for the satisfied properties can be found in (Cabalar et al. 2018;
Cabalar et al. 2019b; Cabalar et al. 2019a) and in this paper. To complete the table, the following
result shows that, despite not satisfying epistemic splitting, the semantics propsed by Gelfond (2011)
does satisfy subjective constraing monotonicity.
Proposition 8. The semantics defined by Gelfond (2011) satisfies subjective constraint mono-
tonicity.
6 Conclusions
We have shown that Founded Autoepistemic EEL satisfies the epistemic splitting, a desirable
property for epistemic logic programs that, among previous semantics, was known to be sat-
isfied only by G91. On the other hand, it is well-known that the G91 semantics suffers from
self-supported world views, something that was proved to be not the case for Founded Autoepis-
temic EEL in (Cabalar et al. 2019a). In this sense, FoundedAutoepistemic EEL is the first seman-
tics whose world views are not self-supported and that satisfies epistemic splitting. Furthermore,
we have shown that, for epistemic tight programs (those not containing cycles involving pos-
itive epistemic literals), both G91 and Founded Autoepistemic EEL coincide. This means that
Founded Autoepistemic EEL corrects the problem with self-supported world views present in
G91 without introducing further variations that are unrelated to this problem.
In addition, we have introduced Founded EEL, a logic which can be considered as a combi-
nation of the stable models semantics and the modal logic S5, and an alternative characterisation
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of Founded Autoepistemic EEL-world views in terms of Founded EEL and G91. This alternative
characterisation may help us to further study properties of Founded Autoepistemic EEL and, in
fact, it already has been used to prove the epistemic splitting property, strengthen the relation
between Founded Autoepistemic EEL and G91, and also to study the relation with the Epistemic
Equilibrium Logic introduced by Farin˜as del Cerro et al. (2015).
References
CABALAR, P., FANDINNO, J., AND FARIN˜AS DEL CERRO, L. 2018. Splitting Epistemic Logic Programs.
arXiv e-prints, arXiv:1812.08763.
CABALAR, P., FANDINNO, J., AND FARIN˜AS DEL CERRO, L. 2019a. Founded world views withautoepis-
temic equilibrium logic. In LPNMR. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (to appear). Springer.
CABALAR, P., FANDINNO, J., AND FARIN˜AS DEL CERRO, L. 2019b. Splitting epistemic logic programs.
In LPNMR. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (to appear). Springer.
FARIN˜AS DEL CERRO, L., HERZIG, A., AND SU, E. I. 2015. Epistemic equilibrium logic. In Proc. of the
Intl. Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI’15). AAAI Press, 2964–2970.
GELDER, A. V., ROSS, K. A., AND SCHLIPF, J. S. 1991. The well-founded semantics for general logic
programs. J. ACM 38, 3, 620–650.
GELFOND, M. 1987. On stratified autoepistemic theories. In AAAI. Morgan Kaufmann, 207–211.
GELFOND, M. 1991. Strong introspection. In Proceedings of the AAAI Conference, T. L. Dean and K.McK-
eown, Eds. Vol. 1. AAAI Press/The MIT Press, 386–391.
GELFOND, M. 2011. New semantics for epistemic specifications. In LPNMR. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol. 6645. Springer, 260–265.
GELFOND, M. AND LIFSCHITZ, V. 1988. The stable model semantics for logic programming. In Proc. of
the 5th Intl. Conference on Logic Programming (ICLP’88). 1070–1080.
GELFOND, M. AND PRZYMUSINSKA, H. 1992. On consistency and completeness of autoepistemic theo-
ries. Fundam. Inform. 16, 1, 59–92.
KAHL, P., WATSON, R., BALAI, E., GELFOND, M., AND ZHANG, Y. 2015. The language of epistemic
specifications (refined) including a prototype solver. Journal of Logic and Computation.
KAHL, P. T. AND LECLERC, A. P. 2018. Epistemic logic programs with world view constraints. In ICLP
(Technical Communications). OASICS, vol. 64. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik,
1:1–1:17.
LECRERC, A. P. AND KAHL, P. T. 2018. Epistemic logic programs with world view constraints. In
Technical communication, 34th International Conference on Logic Programming (ICLP’2018).
LEONE, N., RULLO, P., AND SCARCELLO, F. 1997. Disjunctive stable models: Unfounded sets, fixpoint
semantics, and computation. Inf. Comput. 135, 2, 69–112.
LIFSCHITZ, V. AND TURNER, H. 1994. Splitting a logic program. In Proc. of the Intl. Conference on
Logic Programming (ICLP’94). MIT Press, 23–37.
MOORE, R. C. 1985. Semantical considerations on nonmonotonic logic. Artif. Intell. 25, 1, 75–94.
SHEN, Y. AND EITER, T. 2017. Evaluating epistemic negation in answer set programming (extended
abstract). In Proc. of the Intl. Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI’17). 5060–5064.
TRUSZCZYN´SKI, M. 2011. Revisiting epistemic specifications. In Logic Programming, Knowledge Rep-
resentation, and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 6565. Springer,
315–333.
WANG, K. AND ZHANG, Y. 2005. Nested epistemic logic programs. In LPNMR. Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, vol. 3662. Springer, 279–290.
WATSON, R. 2000. A splitting set theorem for epistemic specifications. CoRR: Proceedings of the 8th
International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning, NMR 2000 cs.AI/0003038.
